Introduction
Capital structure theorists maintain that costs of financial distress (cfd) act as a counterbalance in the face of tax-and other benefits arising from increased leverage and that they should therefore influence firms' capital structure decisions.
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But despite the importance of the topic, estimation of cfd -more precisely estimation of indirect cfd -still remains a largely unexplored issue, both regarding the availability of results and regarding appropriate methodologies. For the US, estimates of the magnitude of indirect cfd exist, but are ambiguous. 2 Evidence for Germany is basically inexistent: to our knowledge there is no study that tries to estimate indirect costs of financial distress ex post and / or expected (ex ante) costs of financial distress.
Thus, in this paper we aim to fill this gap by trying to verify the existence and magnitude of indirect cfd for a sample of German industrial firms, using both, an expost and an ex-ante approach. Such a specific reference to Germany seems particularly worthwhile for at least two reasons:
First, German firms have different governance structures than US firms. In particular, tighter bank-firm relations than in the US exist because of German bank's role in financing firms. 3 Thus, in the spirit of Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1990) German firms could have lower cfd than US firms.
Second, concerning book values, German firms seem to have higher debt/equity ratios than US firms on average. 4 Estimates on German cfd might help to answer the question whether this difference is due to differences in cfd.
Our analysis focuses on two particular empirical approaches to measure cfd:
Opler /Titman (1994) verify the existence of ex post, indirect costs of financial distress as sales losses and other declines in operating performance of (ex-ante) highly levered firms in industry-wide economic downturns. Bar-Or (2000) estimates the absolute magnitude of ex ante costs of financial distress by comparing market values of equity with equity values derived from analysts' earnings forecasts.
1 See e.g. Kraus/Litzenberger (1973) , zur Linden (1975) , Kim (1978) , Chen (1979) , Flath/Knoeber (1980) , Morris (1982) , Bradley/Jarrell/Kim (1984 We chose these two models for two reasons. First, existing empirical results suggest that indirect cfd exceed direct cfd and thus seem more important for the capital structure choice. 5 The Opler/Titman (1994) approach tries to retrieve the effects of indirect cfd.
Second, Bar-Or's (2000) model is to our knowledge the sole existing suggestion on how to derive an estimate of ex ante / expected cfd, even though that is the relevant variable according to static trade-off models of capital structure.
The main results of our study are as follows: First, using the Opler/Titman (1994) approach on our German CDAX database, we do not find that ex-ante highly levered firms in distressed industries have lower sales growth than more conservatively financed counterparts as found by Opler/Titman (1994) . In fact our results suggest that ex-ante highly levered firms in distressed industries even seem to outperform their low levered counterparts, although these latter results are not all significant. In line with
Opler/Titman (1994), we find that high leverage has a negative impact on sales growth even in non distressed industries. Unfortunately, we achieve only a very low explanatory power with the Opler/Titman (1994) model and our data, overall.
Second, with a modified version of Bar-Or's (2000) model, we arrive at average, "preliminary" 6 , expected cfd of around 28% of firm value (median is 44%) for our sample. In a simple cross sectional OLS regression, we also find that firm leverage, interest coverage and book to market seem to be determinants of the obtained ex-ante cfd measure. But after all, we doubt that Bar-Or's (2000) model is well suited to quantifying expected cfd.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some theoretical aspects surrounding cfd and provides a review of the existing empirical evidence on cfd.
In section 3, we introduce the Opler/Titman (1994) model, describe the data and present the results of our own study. Section 4 is then devoted to Bar-Or's (2000) approach: We introduce and discuss his original model and then report how our own implementation of this model fared. Section 5 concludes.
4 See e.g. Rajan/Zingales (1995) p. 1427 Table II . The authors point out that the results are sensitive to accounting adjustments, especially the treatment of pension liabilities. See Rajan/Zingales (1995 ) p. 1433 See e.g. Altman (1984) , Opler/Titman (1994) , Andrade/Kaplan (1998) . 6 Bar-Or (2000) distinguishes "preliminary" and final cfd estimates. See Bar-Or (2000) pp. 15, 38 and section 3 b) of this paper.
Costs of Financial Distress

Theory and Terminology
In financial economics the prominence of cfd stems from prior work on the capital structure choice of firms, more precisely on the static trade-off theory. Important early contributions are due to Kraus/Litzenberger (1973) , zur Linden (1975) , Kim (1978) , Chen (1979) , Flath/Knoeber (1980) , Morris (1982) and Bradley/Jarrell/Kim (1984) among others. More recent contributions are Titman/Tsykaplov (2002) and Kahl (2002) .
The purpose of our study is not to set forth this theory; here, it shall suffice to clarify some terminological issues surrounding the empiric literature 7 on cfd:
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The term ex-post cfd refers to costs obtained with hindsight, whereas ex-ante cfd are estimated under uncertainty beforehand.
Direct cfd are all immediate insolvency costs, such as fees for legal advise and court proceedings. Information on these costs is publicly available and obtaining estimates of direct cfd is therefore mainly an issue of the researcher's industriousness.
Indirect cfd on the other hand are all declines in value associated with distress. Such value losses can occur before or after a firm actually files for bankruptcy and they can appear under various guises: e.g. debt holders' priority rights might lead to inefficient reorganization, 9 customers might be reluctant to purchase long lived assets from a nearly distressed firm, 10 distress endangered firms might have to sell assets of high specificity at "fire-sales prices", 11 and healthy competitors might seek to increase their market share. 12 For obvious reasons, it is difficult to measure indirect cfd. We review the existing empiric literature on both, direct and indirect cfd in section 2.2.
Finally we shall make a short reference to the issue of financial distress vs. The logarithm of sales is included among the independent variables to control for a size related performance impact. The industry-adjusted investment-to-assets ratio controls for the influence of investment behavior on performance and the industry-adjusted asset sales ratio for performance effects originating from asset sales.
But OT's analysis mainly focuses on a number of dummies and dummy interaction variables. One dummy indicates a distressed industry, another dummy indicates whether a firm is in the high leverage group and the interaction between the two variables measures the combined effect of industry distress and high leverage. In order to avoid the reverse causality problem mentioned earlier, leverage leads the beginning of a two year performance-observation-period by one year. Figure I illustrates the time lag design. to the base year t (i.e. at the outset of the two year observation period). is the ratio EBIT/Assets, the ratio of investments/assets and the ratio of asset sales/assets, all three are static variables of firm i two years prior to the base year t and all are industry adjusted. and are respectively the distress and leverage dummies. Similar to OT, we adjust for industry effects by calculating the absolute difference between realizations of a certain variable and the industry mean across all firms in the industry in that year.
Concerning the dummies, is our leverage dummy for firm i three years prior to t (i.e. one year prior to a specific two year observation period). It is set equal to one if firm i's leverage in that year exceeds the 70% leverage percentile over all firms and all years and equal to zero otherwise. is an alternative leverage dummy which we set equal to one if firm i's leverage exceeds the 90% percentile, everything else equal. is the distressed industry dummy in t, set equal to one if mean In OT, all other things equal, the mean stock return must be below -0.3 for this dummy to be set 1. 31
We found this technically more convenient to work with. 
Figure II: Time lag design of our regression
This figure demonstrates the time lag design of our implementation of Opler/Titman's (1994) model. LD is the leverage dummy, LC stands for leverage, EAA is industry adjusted ebit/assets, IAA is industry adjusted investments/assets, ASA is industry adjusted asset sales/assets, LSL is the log of sales, SGA is industry adjusted sales growth (2y), EGA is industry adjusted ebit growth (2y), SRA is industry adjusted stock returns (2y) and DD is the distressed industry dummy.
Since we use two dummy variables and one interaction dummy in our regression equation, there are a number of possible intercepts which are of relevance for our interpretations. Table III shows the possible dummy constellations. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use DATASTREAM as our data source and employ DATASTREAM's CDAX industry classifications and constituent lists to retrieve data for all firms in an industry. Table IV Distribution of distressed industries and firms 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 73 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 We exclude all banks and insurance companies as debt instruments are a source of income for these firms and so leverage plays a different role. 33
In order for an industry to be accepted in the final sample, OT require that it should have a minimum of four firms, see Opler/Titman (1994) p. 1022. In our sample, the industry with the fewest firms that deliver valid datasets is "media" with six firms and hence we meet OT's requirement. OT also require that their industries have "at least one firm in the top three sample leverage deciles and one firm not in the top three deciles per year". Opler/Titman (1994) p. 1022. This requirement is also met by our sample: only firms in industry "utilities" are consistently (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) analyses on stock returns and operating income lead the authors to conclude that the sales growth reductions are "customer-" or "competitor-driven" and hence represent costs of financial distress. 40 OT also report a negative and significant leverage dummy coefficient (β 6 = -3%), which is interpreted as follows: "leveraged firms lose market share to their more conservatively financed counterparts even in good times".
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Tables VII and VIII have our own results. Table IX is an overview of the intercepts corresponding to the coefficient estimates in Tables VII and VIII.
Table VII
Regression results for distress definition DD I SGA, SRA and EGA are industry-adjusted two-year sales growth, industry-adjusted two-year stock returns and industry-adjusted two-year EBIT growth respectively. LD1 (LD2) is a leverage dummy indicating whether a firm is in the 70% (90%) percentile of the distribution of total liabilities to total assets. LSL is the natural logarithm of total sales. EAA, IAA and ASA are industry-adjusted earnings-toassets, industry-adjusted investment-to-assets and industry-adjusted asset sales-to-assets ratios. DD I is the mean based industry distress dummy.*significant at 10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 SGA, SRA and EGA are industry-adjusted two-year sales growth, industry-adjusted two-year stock returns and industry-adjusted two-year EBIT growth respectively. LD1 (LD2) is a leverage dummy indicating whether a firm is in the 70% (90%) percentile of the distribution of total liabilities to total assets. LSL is the natural logarithm of total sales. EAA, IAA and ASA are industry-adjusted earnings-toassets, industry-adjusted investment-to-assets and industry-adjusted asset sales-to-assets ratios. DD II is the median based industry distress dummy. *significant at 10% level, **5% level, ***1% level. ) and which leverage dummy (LD1 or LD2) we use, the leverage dummy's coefficient estimate is significantly negative (at least on a 10% level). This means that industry adjusted sales growth is significantly lower for all firms with high ex-ante leverage than for those with low ex-ante leverage. We also find that the industry distress dummy is positive across all sales growth specifications (significant only in the DD1 equations). This seems to suggest that industry adjusted sales growth is c.p. higher for ex-ante low leveraged firms in distressed industries than for ex-ante low leveraged firms in normal industries.
However, the coefficient of this dummy is difficult to interpret because of the adjustment for industry effects on the dependent variable.
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So far, our results -though weaker -qualitatively agree with OT's. 43 But contrary to OT, we find a positive coefficient of the interaction dummy in all sales growth equations (in the DD1/LD1 it is even significant). Thus, highly-levered firms do not seem to face additional losses in economic downturns compared to their lower levered competitors. This result was unexpected.
There are several possible interpretations of this result, which shall be discussed in turn:
First, there could be benefits of leverage in distress. Wruck (1990) e.g. argues that
"forced" reorganization may enhance operational efficiency in distress situations. Some other authors, such as Jensen (1989) , Bronars/Dear (1991) and Dasgupta/Sengupta (1993) argue that a threat of bankruptcy could improve the bargaining power of management against other (rent earning) stakeholders, such as employees. If enhanced efficiency and improved bargaining power would lead to higher sales and not only to lower costs, then our results would be consistent with these hypotheses.
Second, German governance peculiarities might have given rise to our results.
Hoshi/Kashyap/Scharfstein (1990) e.g. present evidence from Japan that distressed firms in keiretsus perform better (i.e. they invest and sell more) than distressed firms outside of keiretsus. They also show that firms that are not keiretsu members, but still have close relations to a main bank, invest and sell more than firms without such bank ties. These findings can be interpreted as evidence that these firms have lower cfd.
German firms have traditionally maintained close ties to main banks, too. But conforming to the notion of customer or competitor driven impacts on sales (suggested by OT), there would have to be some peculiar reaction of German customers or competitors for this argument to make sense. For example customers, knowing that banks do not abandon distressed firms, would not seize to do business with these firms.
See Opler/Titman (1994) p. 1026. OT also find a significant positive coefficient of the industry distress dummy. This appears to suggests that sales growth is 11.1% higher for firms in distressed than for those in non-distressed industries. But keep in mind that the dependent variable is adjusted for industry effects. Thus, on average the dependent variable has to be zero in distressed industries as well as in non-distressed industries. This means that the coefficients of the distressed industry dummy are difficult to interpret. 43
See also Opler/Titman (1994) p. 1026. In OT's sales growth equation, the coefficient estimates for the three dummies are all significant at the 1% level. We find all three dummies to be significant simultaneously (10% level) only in our DD I /LD1 specification. OT report an adj. R 2 of 5% for their sales growth equation. For our sales growth regressions we obtain an adj. R 2 of only about 1.7%-1.9%.
The regression results for the other two dependent variables, stock returns and EBIT growth (industry adjusted), are disappointing: Explanatory power is low, most of the dummy coefficient estimates are insignificant and coefficient signs in the stock return equations are unstable. Since OT primarily use these regressions to distinguish customer-and competitor-driven sales losses from management-driven sales losses, and since our results do not verify sales losses for financially distressed firms, we will not devote any further attention to these equations.
To check the robustness of our results, we performed various additional analyses: First, we used non industry adjusted but otherwise identical dependent variables in the above equations: the leverage dummy remains negative (in part significantly) and the interaction variable mainly remains insignificant with changing sign across different specifications. The explanatory power of the sales growth model jumps up somewhat: adjusted R 2 is between 3.6% and 3.8%. Second, we check if leverage is lagged too much by simply specifying a time lag of t-2 instead of t-3 for the leverage. Third, we analyze a shorter observation period by computing one-year (from t-1 to t) instead of two-year growth rates (from t-2 to t) from our raw data. The results of these modifications do not allow us to draw any new conclusions though.
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The ex ante approach of Bar-Or
The original model
According to Bar-Or (2000) , costs of financial distress can be described as the difference between the value of the equity of a firm under partial debt financing as derived from a DCF approach (flow to equity) based on IBES earnings forecasts and the market capitalization of that firm. His key assumption is that the earnings forecasts are not adjusted for expected costs of financial distress whereas the capital market entirely deducts expected costs of financial distress: Let be the financial distress costs of firm i at time t, be the equity value under partial debt financing of firm i at time t as derived from a discounted flow to equity model based on earnings forecasts and finally be the market capitalization of firm i at time t. Then, Bar-Or's (2000) order to derive a present value of (free) cash flow to equity. In the first phase, Bar-Or (2000) discounts the maximum number of earnings forecasts (n) available for each firm.
In the second phase he projects earnings forecasts up to year 10, using an IBES estimated mid-term growth rate. The third phase is then the terminal value phase. 
Discussion of Bar-Or's Model (2000)
The Bar-Or (2000) model is not undisputable. We shall discuss some arguments that can be brought forward against the model shortly:
Bar-Or (2000) believes that earnings estimates are based on going concern assumptions and do not incorporate cfd. 45 Earnings estimates should therefore be biased upwards.
One of the questions that arises in this context is whether analysts' earnings estimates could not be positively biased for reasons other than unconsidered cfd. Bar-Or (2000) considers the alternative of intentionally inflated forecasts: he analyzes standard deviation of earnings over total assets and the number of analysts following a given firm and reasons that if the former is low and the latter high, sample firms are more predictable and forecasts thus less likely to be inflated intentionally. Although not explicitly stated, a major implicit hypothesis of Bar-Or´s (2000) model is that expected costs of financial distress increase with leverage. 47 Considering a single firm in a static trade-off world, this seems obvious: An interior optimal capital structure solution only materializes if total costs of debt increase progressively with leverage and with absolute debt level. However, considering a cross section of firms, the hypothesis is less obvious: here, the observed debt levels and leverages should already reflect the optimal capital structures of these firms. Thus, Bar-Or´s (2000) hypothesis can be restated in more accurate terms as: expected costs of financial distress at optimal capital structures increase in leverage. But as we illustrate with a simple example in the Appendix, this does not have to be the case if cost functions differ across sample firms.
Despite these justified objections, we decided to implement the Bar-Or (2000) model mainly because it still seems to be the only existing proposal of an ex-ante methodology. We shall however handle the absolute magnitudes of the FDC-measure with great caution.
Implementation of a modified Bar-Or (2000) Model
When computing we deviate from Bar-Or's (2000) original version in that we do not first discount the earnings and then adjust them using his proposed adjustment terms. Instead, we start directly by building the flow to equity and then discount the latter. We do this for two reasons. First, Bar-Or (2000) did not sufficiently explain how the adjustment terms were obtained.
48 Second, as data is available for the conversion of earnings to a flow to equity, we propose to use it. Our approach then has the following form: Again using a single factor CAPM with , where i is the risk free rate and r the expected return on the market portfolio. for the maximum number of years that they are available k, starting with year t=1
(1/1/2000).
We then project future EPS --up to year t=11 (which is the first year of the terminal value phase) using an IBES estimated 5-year growth rate , applied to the last available explicit IBES estimate: .
We use this growth rate until year t=5. Between t=6 and t=10, we apply a fade factor that fades down the mid term growth rate. As a basic fade factor, we use 50%. In a sensitivity analysis, we also employ fade factors of 25% and 75%. Concerning the prediction of each of the five adjustment terms in (2) from t=1 to t=11, we proceed as follows: For t=1 to t=3 (i.e. 1/1/2000 to 1/1/2002) we take actual variable values (which are known today, but were not known on our valuation date) as proxies for the analyst estimates. For t=4 we take the mean of the respective variable over the years t=-2 to t=2. Finally for t=4 to t=11 we linearly fade this mean towards 0, so that at the beginning of the terminal value phase holds.
Estimates of absolute corporate earnings were not available from IBES. One might object to these fade factors as being manipulatory on the valuation results. However, we analyzed sensitivity of our results with respect to three substantially different fade factors (25%, 50% and 75%) and as table X below shows, results are quite stable across these variations. In addition, arbitrariness of the fade factors would at most influence the absolute valuation results and
Data and results
We obtain all our data from DATASTREAM. The required data was only available for 49 of the DAX100 companies.
53 Table X We focus on DAX100 firms for the predictability issues mentioned in section 4.4. We further decided to exclude three extreme outliers: First, Babcock has a book to market ratio below -1 whereas the median book to market ratio is about 0.28 for all other firms. Second, Krones has a book to market ratio of 8.8 and was also excluded as an outlier. Third, SAP has calculated financial distress costs (FDC1) of more than -1,200% and an interest coverage ratio above 307.
We additionally decided to exclude firms where we obtained a negative equity value .
We also run our analyses for the sample that includes the above outliers. Interestingly, inclusion of outliers leads to higher adjusted R² and mostly stable other coefficients. 54
See Bar-Or (2000) FDC values rise almost monotonously with (optimal) leverage. This seems to support the above mentioned joint hypothesis even for the inter-industry-sample: expected costs of financial distress seem to increase with higher optimal levels of debt across different firms.
We have to admit that our absolute FDC values seem much too high as estimates for the absolute costs of financial distress: even under conservative growth assumptions (75% fade factor) we obtain a mean of 28.6% of firm value and a median of 44% across the entire sample. We also further analyze the relation between leverage and FDC by running a simple OLS regression of FDC I on leverage and alternatively on log leverage. 58 Table XII reports the results. Finally we analyze whether our FDC estimates are affected by other variables that are hypothesized to have an impact on cfd. Bar-Or (2000) regresses FDC on leverage, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, a proxy for earnings growth, two volatility proxiesone for the volatility of returns and the other for the volatility of operating earnings -a proxy for firm size and a proxy for the complexity of the capital structure. He expects coefficients of the leverage variables to be significantly positive. Firms with high R&D expenditures relative to sales are companies with specialized products which should experience higher cfd. He also expects higher cfd for firms with high earnings growth since a large fraction of their value consists of future earnings that could be lost in distress. His hypothesis for the two volatility proxies is ambivalent: On the one hand higher volatility could result in higher cfd due to a higher distress probability, but on the other hand it could also increase the value of equity as a call option on the assets. 
. 62 We expect . and are the standard deviations of the monthly stock return and of the return on assets
respectively. We will not hypothesize on the signs of and . and are alternatively used as proxies for firm size, where the former represents total assets and the later total sales of firm i in t=0. ante cfd. Although our cash coefficient is negative in most regressions, it is always statistically insignificant.
Conclusions
The major goal of this paper was to verify the existence of cfd for German firms using an ex post methodology and to estimate the magnitude of ex ante cfd for German firms.
Concerning the first end, we could not document that firms with high ex-ante leverage in distressed industries perform worse than firms with low-ex ante leverage in distressed industries. Thus, with our German sample we did not find evidence for the existence of cfd as did Opler/Titman (1994) . However, we found tentative evidence 65 . But as costs of financial distress grow faster for firm B than for firm A when increasing D, the absolute amount of costs of financial distress at the optimal debt level may well be higher for firm B than for firm A, despite the lower optimal debt level: As the cost function of debt is identical for both firms, Bar-Or´s modified hypothesis has to hold: Costs of financial distress of different firms are increasing with optimal debt levels. Thus the empirical test of this hypothesis may actually suffer from some "joint hypothesis" problem: Bar-Or's (2000) hypothesis states that the calculated FDC measure is a good proxy for expected costs of financial distress and that the costs of financial distress are similar over the different firms in the sample analyzed. Due to the reasons discussed above the second part of the hypothesis may be dependent on the sample composition.
( ) ( )
firm under all equity financing V E (and thus on a variable that is independent from debt and leverage ratio), differences in size between A and B may become important. For our purpose here it is sufficient to show that C and is at least possible: For different firms with different cost functions of debt, costs of financial distress at optimal debt do not necessarily have to increase in optimal leverage ratios.
